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In a recent work [Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 108, 3838 (2011)], Schneider et al. proposed a
new measure for network robustness and investigated optimal networks with respect to this quantity.
For networks with a power-law degree distribution, the optimized networks have an onion structure—
high-degree vertices forming a core with radially decreasing degrees and an overrepresentation of
edges within the same radial layer. In this paper we relate the onion structure to graphs with
good expander properties (another characterization of robust network) and argue that networks
of skewed degree distributions with large spectral gaps (and thus good expander properties) are
typically onionly structured. Furthermore, we propose a generative algorithm producing synthetic
scale-free networks with onion structure, circumventing the optimization procedure of Schneider et
al. We validate the robustness of our generated networks against malicious attacks and random
removals.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 89.75.Hc, 05.10.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, there has been a lot of research
relating the structure and function of networks [1–6]. The
common picture is that real-world networks are to some
degree random, but also have some regularities. These
regularities, the network structure, affect dynamical pro-
cesses taking place on the network. Examples of such
processes include epidemic spreading, synchronization,
random walks and opinion formation. If follows that the
network structure can influence how robust a dynamic
system is to targeted attacks and random failures [7–
12]. Since the robustness and stability of networks is
relevant for the reliability and security of our modern
infrastructures—such as electricity systems, power-grids,
sewage systems, cell-phone networks and the Internet—it
is important to know how to generate (or design) robust
networks.
When a fraction of vertices in a network are malfunc-
tioning due to either random failures or malicious at-
tacks, the whole network may be broken into isolated
parts. Assuming the indirect connectivity is important
for the system to function, we can take this fragmentation
process as reflecting the breakdown of the system’s func-
tionality. In the context of percolation theory, this frag-
mentation can be monitored by the critical occupancy
threshold qc—i.e. the fraction of functioning vertices
needed for a finite fraction of the network to be connected
(in the large-size limit of a network model) [7–10]. In-
stead of considering this criterion for robustness, Schnei-
der et al. [11], focused on the evolution of the largest
component (connected subgraph) when one repeatedly
remove the highest-degree vertices in the network. In
particular, they introduced an index, R, to weigh the
robustness of network, which is defined as
R =
1
N
1∑
q=1/N
s(q), (1)
where N is the number of vertices in the network and
s(q) is the fraction of vertices in the largest connected
cluster after removing qN vertices. The normalization
factor 1/N makes it easier to compare the robustness of
networks with different sizes. The value of R lies strictly
in the range [1/N, 0.5], where the two limits correspond
to a network with star structure and a fully connected
network [12]. This situation is similar in other types of
optimization of conflicting objectives [13, 14].
An heuristic method for maximizing R while keeping
the degree sequence fixed is to pick random pairs of edges
and swap these [(i, j) and (i′, j′) to (i, j′) and (i′, j)]
whenever a swap increases R. When no more swaps
can increase R, the procedure is terminated. The fi-
nal networks, after this optimization procedure, will then
have a conspicuous onion structure with a core of highly
connected vertices, hierarchically surrounded by layers
of vertices with decreasing degrees. Although one can
achieve a considerable enhancement of the robustness by
this method, it is not so appropriate in practice for two
reasons. Assuming that there are M edges in a network,
since the swapping of two arbitrary edges can impact the
value of R, the computational complexity of the method
of Schneider et al. scales as O(M2). On top of this, it
takes time for the correlations to propagate through the
system so that the time for the greedy algorithm to con-
verge also increase with the system size. All-in-all the
running time is thus close to cubic, which makes the ap-
proach prohibitively slow for large systems.
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2In this paper, we present an alternative way to gener-
ate networks with onion structures under the constraint
of invariant degree value of each vertex, and with com-
putational complexity of order O(M). Since broad de-
gree distribution are common in nature and society, we
will focus our attention on generating scale-free networks
with onion topology. We validate the efficiency of our al-
gorithm by investigating the response of the generated
networks to malicious attacks and random failures, and
compare these to the networks obtained by the optimiza-
tion procedure of Ref. [11].
II. MODEL
It has been suggested that the resilience of networks
depends strongly on their assortativity, i.e., on how the
vertices connect with each other [16]. To be more spe-
cific, assortatively mixed networks (i.e., high degree ver-
tices are more likely linked with other vertices also with
high degrees) are considerably more robust against the
removal of vertices than their disassortative counterparts
(i.e., high degree vertices are more likely linked with other
vertices with low degrees) [17]. Thus, keeping invariant
the degree of each vertex and varying the mixing pat-
tern among the vertices to increase assortativity would
improve the robustness of a network. However, as was
pointed out in [11], onion and assortativity are distinct
properties, and high assortative networks may be signifi-
cantly fragile to malicious attacks due to the lack of onion
topology. Nonetheless, these two properties are highly
relevant: not all assortative networks have onion struc-
ture, but all onion networks are assortative (the vertices
with similar degrees are connected more frequently, as we
show below).
The time consuming optimization in Ref. [11] calls for
a quicker, heuristic method to generate robust networks
with a prescribed degree distribution [11]. To do this,
we first generate a set of N random numbers {ki} drawn
from a distribution P (k) ∼ k−γ . These numbers repre-
sent the degrees of the N vertices in the networks. One
can think of the numbers as “stubs” or half-edges, stick-
ing out from their respective vertices. Each vertex i is
then assigned a layer index si according to its ki value.
For the sake of convenience, we rank the vertices by de-
gree, increasingly. We set the layer index for the vertices
with lowest degree is 0, the index for the set of vertices
with second lowest degree is 1, and so on until all ver-
tices have been assigned an si. Then we connect the stubs
by selecting a pair at random and joining these with a
probability dependent on the layer difference of the two
vertices according to∏
ij
=
1
1 + a|∆ij | , (2)
where ∆ij = si − sj is the difference in layer index be-
tween i and j, and a > 0 is a control parameter. Accord-
ing to Eq. (2), the vertices within a layer are connected
In-layer edges Between-layer edges
FIG. 1: (Color online) Visualization of a typical onion net-
work generated by our algorithm with N = 100 vertices,
〈k〉 = 5.8, and a degree distribution P (k) ∼ k−2.5. The lowest
and highest degrees in this network are, respectively, 3 and
26. The sizes of the vertices are proportional to their degree,
and vertices with the same layer indices are marked by the
same color, and edges between nodes with equal degree are
highlighted.
with greater probability than vertices in different layers.
With the increase of the layer index difference,
∏
ij ap-
proaches zero rapidly. The elementary stub-connection
process is repeated until all the stubs have been used up.
No duplicate connections between two vertices and self-
loop connections are allowed during the construction of
the network. It is easy to see that the networks generated
in this way should be of onion property.
The parameter a in Eq. (2) is the only independent
parameter of our model. If a = 0, our algorithm re-
duces to the well known configuration model of Molloy
and Reed [18, 19]. This, we argue, means that the net-
work has a minimum of onion structure. If the value of a
is too large, the connection probabilities among vertices
with different degrees become so small that the networks
get either stratified and one-dimensional [15] or even frag-
mented in core where a layer typically consists of only one
vertex. In sum, the optimal a-value, with respect to ro-
bustness, is intermediate. In the present study, we use
a = 3 unless otherwise stated. For a = 3, P (k) ∼ k−2.5,
〈k〉 = 4.75, and N = 2000, there is typically fraction of
stubs (about 1.8%, and we have checked that for larger
size N , this fraction can be even decreased) that cannot
be paired in the construction process. In practice this is
not much of a problem as it can easily be remedied by
the following reshuffle procedure.
31. For stubs that are unpaired after many trials, we
randomly select two of them at each step.
2. We randomly choose a connection already existing
in the network, and simply cut it so that we get
two “new” stubs.
3. Then we attach the two “new” stubs to the two
selected ones to form two connections, and at
the same time check if any duplicates and self-
connections are produced.
4. We accept the change if the resulting graph is sim-
ple (has no multiple edges or self edges), otherwise
we undo the change and go back to step 2 to make
a new try.
This procedure is repeatedly repeated until all the re-
maining stubs are paired.
In addition to the graphs with the algorithm presented
in this paper, we also create onion scale-free networks ac-
cording to the method proposed in [11], which will serve
as a benchmark for comparison. In particular, we first
obtain a scale-free network by procedure of the configu-
ration model [18] with the same degree sequences. From
this original network, we swap pairs of randomly cho-
sen edges if and only if such a move would increase the
robustness. This is done as follows. Before swapping
the two randomly selected connections, we carry out 100
independent attacks as will be described below. The av-
erage robustness value is called R0. Then we swap the
neighbors of the two connections, and implement another
100 independent attacks to determine the robustness of
the new network R1. The swap of the neighbors is ac-
cepted only if and only if it would increase the robustness,
i.e., R1 > R0. This procedure is repeated with another
randomly chosen pair of connections until no further im-
provement is achieved for a given large number of con-
secutive swaps (the last ten thousands steps).
In Fig. 1 we show a typical network generated by our
algorithm.
III. RESULTS
To check the efficiency of our algorithm, we attack net-
works generated by our algorithm and those obtained by
the robustness-optimization algorithm of Ref. [11]. The
attack procedure proceeds by removing vertices one by
one in order of the (currently) largest degree (during the
deletion process). To recalculate the degrees during the
attack, rather than removing vertices by the degree of the
original network (as in Ref. [7]), is in line with the idea
that the attacker has a relatively full picture of the sys-
tem. If more is known about a specific system, one can
of course model the attack procedure in greater detail.
This attack-by-current-highest-degree was first proposed
in Ref. [20] and proven to be more efficient [21] than re-
moving vertices by initial degree. Throughout this dele-
tion process we record s(q).
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FIG. 2: (Color online) The fraction of vertices belonging to
the largest connected cluster s(q) versus the fraction q of re-
moved vertices. Vertices are removed according to their cur-
rent degree during the removal to simulate an attack scenario
where an adversary hits the fraction q of the system’s weakest
points. We compare three types of model networks: the con-
figuration model (solid line), the robustness-optimized proce-
dure (dashed line), and our algorithm (dashed-dot line). All
networks have the same parameters as shown in Fig. 1.
We report our simulation results in Fig. 2 where the
relative size s of the largest component as a function of
q, the fraction of removed vertices. The solid, dashed,
dashed-dot lines correspond, respectively, to the cases
that attack is performed on scale-free networks gener-
ated by the configuration model [18], by the optimization
procedure of Ref. [11], and by our algorithm. All these
networks have the same sizes and degree distributions.
Comparing these curves, we note that the robustness-
optimized networks really are more robust. Furthermore,
the curve for our algorithm nearly collapse with the opti-
mized ones. This means that our algorithm can generate
networks almost as robust as the optimization algorithm,
but much faster. We have calculated the degree assor-
tativity proposed by Newman [16]—roughly the Pear-
son correlation coefficient of the degree at either side of
an edge—and found that robustness-optimized networks
and our model networks are more assortative than the
original configuration-model network (not shown). This
means that changing the mixing pattern among the ver-
tices toward positive associativity can enhance the ro-
bustness of network against targeted attack. At the same
time, assortativity and robustness are not necessarily cor-
related [11].
In order to understand how robustness and assortativ-
ity are correlated, we present in Fig. 3 the scatter plot of
the robustness R as a function of the degree assortativ-
ity [16, 17] for 50 networks generated by the configuration
model, and for another 50 ones generated by our algo-
rithm. One can see that the networks generated by our
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Scatter plot of the robustness R as
a function of (a) the assortativity r, and (b) the ratio of
the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix to the second
largest one of the networks λ1/λ2. The plus and cross sym-
bols are the results for 50 networks generated, respectively, by
the configuration model and our algorithm. 200 independent
degree attacks are carried out on each of them. The corre-
sponding results for an optimized network, generated by the
optimization procedure, are also shown for comparison (the
solid triangle). All networks have the same parameters as
shown in Fig. 1.
algorithm are always assortative (r > 0), and they are
also found to be more robust against malicious attack.
It is well known that the spectral property of a net-
work plays an important role in determining the evolu-
tion of dynamical processes, such as synchronization, ran-
dom walks and diffusion, taking place on it [1]. Usually,
the principle eigenvalue are of particularly important. It
has been proven that networks with large spectral gap
(the difference between the first principle eigenvalue and
the second one) are very good expanders, which also is
thought to imply robustness [22]. The expander prop-
erty of a network can by measured approximately by the
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FIG. 4: (Color online) The fraction s(q) of vertices belonging
to the largest connected cluster versus the fraction q of re-
moved vertices using the random attack strategy for scale-free
networks generated by the configuration model (solid line),
and our algorithm (dashed line). The two networks have the
same system size N = 2000, average degree 〈k〉 = 4.75, and
degree sequences. The lowest and highest degrees in the net-
works are, respectively, 2 and 73. Each curve is obtained by
averaging over 2000 independent trials.
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Robustness R (diamonds) and assor-
tativity coefficient r (circles) as a function of a for scale free
networks generated by our algorithm [23]. The error bars in-
dicate the standard errors of the robustness and assortativity
calculated for 50 scale-free networks. All networks have the
same parameters as shown in Fig. 4.
ratio λ1/λ2, where λ1 and λ2 here denote, respectively,
the largest and the second largest eigenvalue of the ad-
jacency matrix of the network, whose elements are ones
or zeroes if the corresponding vertices are adjacent or
not. To confirm the correlation between R and λ1/λ2
we plot the values of these quantities in a scatter plot
(see Fig. 3(b)). This correlation means that the conclu-
sion from Fig. 3(a) also holds if we use a good expander
5property as robustness criterion.
As described so far, our algorithm can be used to de-
sign a network with a given degree sequence that is ro-
bust against malicious attacks. To further confirm the
efficiency of our algorithm, we also simulated random fail-
ure process by site percolation, on the generated scale-
free networks [7]. The simulation results for the rela-
tive size of the largest component after a fraction q of
vertices has been randomly removed, are presented in
Fig. 4. We can see that the percolation threshold is close
to one, which means that the spanning cluster persists
up to nearly 100% failure. This is in accordance with the
results of [4, 8, 9].
Finally, we show in Fig. 5 the robustness R and the as-
sortative coefficient r of the scale free networks generated
by our algorithm as a function of the parameter a. For
each value of a, the data are obtained from an average
over 50 scale-free networks, and for each network realiza-
tion, 100 independent attack-by-current-highest-degree
processes are implemented. It is obvious that the pref-
erential attachment mechanism among the nodes within
the same layers indeed leads to robust networks than the
lack of that.
From the results in Figs. 2– 5, we conclude that robust
scale-free networks with onion structures can be obtained
from the very beginning and without the need of an ex-
plicit optimization.
IV. DISCUSSION
In summary, we have proposed an alternative method
to generate networks that are both robust to malicious at-
tacks and random failures. We started by generating the
degree sequence of a scale-free network with prescribed
power-law degree distribution. From the observation that
robust networks have of onion structure [11], we rank the
vertices in terms of their degree, and assign a layer index
to each vertex. The connection probability of two stubs
is assigned to be related to the layer index difference of
the two host vertices in such a way that the vertices with
similar layer indices are connected with greater probabil-
ity than otherwise. By means of this way, we are able
to generate scale-free networks of onion structure. We
validate our algorithm by testing the robustness of the
obtained network against both a harmful attack, which
progressively remove the vertex with largest degree in the
remain network, and random failures, which is modeled
by site percolation.
In many systems there are different types of edges that
contributes to different aspects of the system’s function-
ality. Refs. [24–28] divide edges into connectivity edge
and dependency edges. The former ones sustaining the
primary connectivity of the system, the latter ones main-
taining the functionality of the former. In the present
study, we have restricted ourselves to the case where
these edges coincide. An obvious further step would be to
generalize the onion-structure generation to such interde-
pendent networks. In general, interdependency can make
networks more fragile [25]. Our preliminary simulations
show that this is indeed the case for both random fail-
ures and malicious attacks of our onion topologies. An-
other issue is that an adversary typically does not have
full information about the system, which would make the
strategy to delete vertices by degree hard [29]. On the
other hand, without information, one is not expected to
do worse than the random failures that we simulate by
percolation. To conclude, without interdependencies and
with a fairly good knowledge of the graph, which is in-
deed the case to several vital infrastructures, onion net-
works are the best bet for constructing a network with
a broad degree distribution that is robust to both errors
and attacks.
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